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is worth doing well, and every page is interesting. The manufacture of the work is typically good. The illustrations are apt and the charts excellent.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

The Independence of the South American Republics. A Study in Recognition and Foreign Policy. By FREDERIC L. PAXSON. (Philadelphia: Ferris and Leach. 1903. Pp. 288.)

THE title to this excellent little volume gives its intention and scope, and Mr. Paxson has with rare restraint confined himself strictly to his subject. Before the American Revolution there was no theory of recognition, and for a state to recognize a revolted colony before the mother-country had given recognition was tantamount to intervention, and a cause for war. The action of France and Holland in recognizing the United States was based upon interested motives, and therefore could not furnish a precedent. The attitude taken by the United States towards France during the French Revolution, in recognizing any government accepted by the French people, was a decided step in advance, but it was not until the doctrine of neutrality had been defined by Washington's cabinet, in the Proclamation of 1794, that the doctrine of recognition could assume a definite form.

Mr. Paxson outlines clearly this rise of a doctrine of recognition, and as clearly recounts the events passing in South America which led to the revolt against Spain and eventually to independence. He then describes the attitude of the United States from the first mission of Poinsett to the recognition of the late Spanish colonies as sovereign states, and that of England from the beginnings of her somewhat uncertain policy to the like issue. He makes use of the manuscripts in the Department of State at Washington, the Adams papers at Quincy, and the records in the Foreign Office, London. His study is based upon original sources.

While England approached the question of recognition from the commercial side, the United States took the higher ground of international right. Action in the matter involved some delicate consideration of neutral rights. Spain looked upon the South American states as rebellious colonies, and therefore not subject to recognition until such action on her own part should admit their claim to be treated as equals. The United States government, on the other hand, regarded the situation as one of civil war, and the parties already on a plane of equality. A recognition given too hastily might injure the cause it was intended to further, and yet inaction on the part of the government would favor positive breaches of neutrality, such as had given the port of Baltimore so bad a name, and delayed the successful issue of certain negotiations between the United States and Spain. Factious attempts by Clay to force the administration to recognize, even at the expense of war, and the action of the agents of the South American states in demanding recognition or offering treaties without instructions or powers, complicated the position of the Executive, but were not successful. Every opportunity was afforded to Spain

to recover her dominion over South America, and when failure was evident, it became useless to permit a continuation of the war or the restoration of a system of government avowedly hostile to republican institutions. Spain alone could not win ; Europe working through Spain might win, but with danger to the United States. Mr. Paxson has justly emphasized the influence of John Quincy Adams in preventing hasty action by the President and cabinet, and in developing a line of action that accomplished all that was necessary at the time and has stood the test of later experience, though sadly misinterpreted on occasions.

We think Mr. Paxson exaggerates the oppressiveness of the Spanish commercial regulations. The fact was that the mercantile system, of which Spain's laws were an example, was out of date, and had been out of touch with the tendency of international trade since the injection of neutral ships and goods, and the varied and mottled experiences under American non-intercourse, paper blockades, French decrees, and British orders in council. But for Napoleon's invasion of Spain the revolt would have occurred at a much later day. The commercial laws pressed lightly on the colonies because they were rendered quite harmless by extensive and tolerated smuggling. The extension of Napoleon's rule over Spain put an end to the existing commercial system of the colonies, and foreign merchants and influences began to be felt. Not until 1811 was independence from Spain seriously considered. As late as 1816 negotiations were conducted for placing a Spanish prince on the throne of Buenos Ayres.

Another weak point in Mr. Paxson's narrative is the little attention given to the actions and opinions of Russia. The ruling spirit of the Holy Alliance was Metternich, but the attitude taken by Russia, a power representing the extreme of absolutism, was of great moment. The part played by the Czar's treatises on government, sent to the members of the alliance and incidentally to the United States, had more than an academic interest. Indeed, they served, better than could any act of France or Spain, to give Adams his opportunity for stating the American doctrine. By nature opposed to liberal ideas in government, it was not to be expected that the Czar would be silent upon Spain's revolution. The feeling that he could count upon the support of the alliance, after its measures in Italy and Spain, gave his utterances a weight greater than could have been commanded by a power more immediately interested in a possible division of the spoils to follow a restoration of Spanish rule in America. When Canning believed that Russia was acting alone, or was placed in such a position that she could only act alone, he ceased to regard the opinion of the Czar.

Whatever aid was given to Spain in conquering her rebellious colonies must be paid for, and how could poor Spain pay in anything but land, in colonial possessions? Was there not an ever-present fear to Canning that France might obtain Cuba as recompense for aid, or that the United States might annex that island by some, to him, high-handed act, of which Jackson's conduct in the Floridas was a precedent? Mr.

Paxson's narrative does not account for Canning's so suddenly dropping his communications on South American matters with Rush, or for his final diplomatic advance to Polignac. Commerce or the pressure of merchants' petitions would have permitted recognition at any time after the entrance of the French armies into Spain. It was for another cause that Canning took the step that was to lead to recognition. Through Rush he had assured himself that the United States had no intention or interest in acquiring territory lately under the dominion of Spain. By Polignac he learned that France had no land-thirst to be assuaged in America. Having ascertained the position of the two powers most directly concerned, he could then prepare the instructions for his agents sent to South America, and deny that Great Britain had any idea of bringing any part of the late Spanish possessions under her dominion, or would tolerate their being brought under the dominion of any other power.

The proof-reading might have been better.

WORTHINGTON C. FORD.

A Political History of Slavery. Being an Account of the Slavery Controversy from the Earliest Agitations in the Eighteenth Century to the close of the Reconstruction Period. By WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, with an introduction by WHITELAW REID. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1903. Pp. xvi, 350; iv, 456.)

THE author of this work was one of the prominent editors and political leaders of Ohio during the period preceding and following our Civil War. He was an active party agent and a leader of party opinion in the course of the events which he narrates. A follower and youthful admirer of Clay and Corwin in Whig days, an ardent Republican and faithful follower and co-worker of Lincoln, Chase, Brough, Morton, and Sherman on the issues of slavery and Civil War, a constant editorial contributor to the party controversies of his day, himself heading his party ticket for the office of secretary of state in Ohio in 1864, Mr. Smith witnessed and helped to make a considerable part of the history of which he writes. His volumes reflect the issues and controversies, the men and measures, as they appeared to him in the midst of the struggle. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that he constructs his political history like an impartial and judicial historian. The party attitude is apparent. The author is fully convinced in his own mind, to begin with, that the cause of civilization and progress is with his side, and this leads him, naturally, to judgments and condemnations, to awarding praise and blame, to the language of censure and denunciation for the opponents of his cause. While the writer is large-minded and at times philosophical, the measure of argument for the other view, the reasons and circumstances influencing the adversary — such as may be necessary to the full presentation of the case in the court of history, are not fully meted out. The pleas of the contestants are not allowed as fully as should be to speak for themselves. But while this is true, as it is true of other con-